(\$2.823 million in MDE) and included eleven (11) Multifunctional Information Distribution System-Low Volume Terminals (MIDS-LVT). The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) has requested the case be amended to include thirty-one (31) MIDS-LVT Block Upgrade 2 (BU2) terminals. This amendment will push the current case above the MDE notification threshold and thus requires notification of the entire case.

Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

Eleven (11) Multifunctional Information Distribution System-Low Volume Terminals (MIDS-LVT) Block Upgrade 1 (BUI).

Thirty-one (31) Multifunctional Information Distribution System-Low Volume Terminals (MIDS-LVT) Block Upgrade 2 (BU2).

Non-MDE: Also included is communications equipment; support equipment; engineering and technical support and assistance; training; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

- (iii) Military Department: Navy (SR-P-LCO).
- (iv) Prior Related Cases, if any: None.
- (v) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None.
- (vi) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.
- (vii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: February 3, 2022.
- *As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Saudi Arabia—Multifunctional Information Distribution System-Low Volume Terminals (MIDS-LVT)

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has requested to buy thirty-one (31) Multifunctional Information Distribution System-Low Volume Terminals (MIDS-LVT) Block Upgrade 2 (BU2), that will be added to a previously implemented case. The original FMS case, valued at \$3.0 million, included eleven (11) Multifunctional Information Distribution System-Low Volume Terminals (MIDS-LVT) Block Upgrade 1 (BUI). Therefore, this notification is for a total or eleven (11) Multifunctional Information Distribution System-Low Volume Terminals (MIDS-LVT) Block Upgrade 1 (BUI) and thirty-one (31) Multifunctional Information Distribution System-Low Volume Terminals (MIDS-LVT) Block Upgrade 2 (BU2). Also included is communications equipment; support equipment; engineering and technical support and assistance; training; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The total estimated cost is \$23.7 million.

This proposed sale will support U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives by helping to improve the security of a friendly country that continues to be an important force for political stability and economic growth in the Middle East.

The proposed sale will provide the Saudi armed forces with the equipment, training, and follow-on support necessary to protect Saudi Arabia, and the region, from the destabilizing effects of terrorism, countering Iranian influence, and other threats. The proposed MIDS-LVT (BU2) terminals will be installed on Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) platforms, while the previously provided MIDS-LVT (BUI) terminals were installed on PATRIOT. Saudi Arabia will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The principal contractor is undetermined as there will a competitive contractual award process after LOA implementation. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

Implementation of this sale will not require the assignment of any U.S. Government or contractor representatives to Saudi Arabia.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed

ARMS SALES NOTIFICATION

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the notifications which have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEFENSE SECURITY
COOPERATION AGENCY,
Arlington, VA.

Hon. ROBERT MENENDEZ,

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 21–56 concerning the Army's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance to the Government of the United Arab Emirates for defense articles and services estimated to cost \$65.0 million. After this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to issue a news release to notify the public of this proposed sale. Sincerely,

James A. Hursch,

Director.

Enclosures.

ires.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 21–56

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

Prospective Purchaser: Government of the United Arab Emirates. $\,$

(ii) Total Estimated Value: Major Defense Equipment \$0.0 million.

Other \$65.0 million.

Total \$65.0 million.

Funding Source: National Funds.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case AE-B-KRG for a Foreign Military Sales Order (FMSO) II to provide funds for blanket order requisitions under a Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Agreement (CLSSA), was below the congressional notification threshold at \$30 million. The case included common spares/repair parts to support the United Arab Emirates' Homing All the Way Killer (HAWK), Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept on Target (PA-TRIOT), and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) weapon systems, additional support; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has requested the case be amended to include funding to cover an additional three years. This amendment, which will add \$35 million of non-MDE, will push the current case above the congressional notification threshold, requiring notification of the entire case before the amendment can be offered.

Major Defense Equipment (MDE): None. Non-MDE: Foreign Military Sales Order (FMSO) II to provide funds for blanket order requisitions under a Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Agreement (CLSSA) for common spares/repair parts to support the United Arab Emirates' Homing All the Way Killer (HAWK), Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept on Target (PATRIOT), and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) weapon systems, additional sup-

port; and other related elements of logistics and program support. (iv) Military Department: Army (AE-B-KRG)

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: TC-B-KVN, AE-B-KRB.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: None.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: February 3, 2022.

*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

United Arab Emirates—Foreign Military Sales Order (FMSO) II Case

The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has requested to buy a Foreign Military Sales Order (FMSO) II to provide funds for blanket order requisitions under a Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Agreement (CLSSA) for common spares/repair parts to support the United Arab Emirates' Homing All the Way Killer (HAWK), Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept on Target (PATRIOT), and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) weapon systems, additional support; and other related elements of logistics and program support. An earlier FMS case, valued at \$30 million. provided this requirement. The amended FMS case would extend the funding to cover an additional three years. The estimated total case value is \$65 million.

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of an important regional partner. The UAE is a vital U.S. partner for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East.

The UAE intends to utilize this follow-on support to maintain its air defense weapon systems in accordance with U.S. maintenance requirements and standards. This sale supports the UAE's existing ability to deter and defend against hostile threats by maintaining the operational readiness of critical air defense systems. The proposed sale will contribute to the UAE's ability to effectively integrate with U.S.-led coalitions and operate independently in support of U.S. interests and the security of U.S. forces in theater, and is consistent with U.S. bilateral and multilateral defense plans in the CENTCOM region. The UAE will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment and serv-

ices into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

There are no principal contractors involved with this potential sale. There are no known offset agreements associated with this sale.

Implementation of this sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S.

Government or contractor representatives to the UAE.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale

ARMS SALES NOTIFICATION

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the notifications which have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEFENSE SECURITY
COOPERATION AGENCY,

Arlington, VA.
Hon. Robert Menendez,

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 21-66, concerning the Army's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) for defense articles and services estimated to cost \$100 million. After this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to issue a news release to notify the public of this proposed sale.

Sincerely,

 $\begin{array}{c} {\rm JAMES~A.~HURSCH,} \\ {\it Director.} \end{array}$

Enclosures.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 21–66

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO).

(ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment* \$0 million.

Other \$100.0 million.

Total \$100.0 million.

Funding Source: National Funds.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE): None.

Non-MDE: Equipment and services to support participation in the Patriot International Engineering Services Program (IESP) and Field Surveillance Program (FSP) for five years, including engineering services support, designed to sustain, maintain, and improve the Patriot Air Defense System within the performance envelope described in the system specification through the investigation and resolution of identified problems; missile field surveillance support for legacy (Guidance Enhanced Missile

(GEM)) and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles, designed to ensure the reliability and performance of the Patriot missile through storage and aging programs, surveillance firing programs, and configuration management; legacy and PAC-3 missile stockpile reliability testing, to provide quantitative reliability assessments of the deployed missile round; U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics support, and other related elements of program support. Participation in the shared IESP and FSP for the life of the Patriot system is a requirement of the U.S. Government.

(iv) Military Department: Army (TW-B- ZDQ).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: TW-B-YYV, TW-B-ZBI.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: None.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: February 7, 2022.

*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States—International Engineering Services Program (IESP) and Field Surveillance Program (FSP) Support

Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) has requested to buy equipment and services to support participation in the Patriot International Engineering Services Program (IESP) and Field Surveillance Program (FSP) for five years, including engineering services support, designed to sustain, maintain, and improve the Patriot Air Defense System within the performance envelope described in the system specification through the investigation and resolution of identified problems; missile field surveillance support legacy (Guidance Enhanced Missile (GEM)) and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles, designed to ensure the reliability and performance of the Patriot missile through storage and aging programs, surveillance firing programs, and configuration management; legacy and PAC-3 missile stockpile reliability testing, to provide quantitative reliability assessments of the deployed missile round; U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics support, and other related elements of program support. Participation in the shared IESP and FSP for the life of the Patriot system is a requirement of the U.S. Government. The total estimated program cost is \$100.0 mil-

This proposed sale is consistent with U.S. law and policy as expressed in Public Law 96–8.

This proposed sale serves U.S. national, economic, and security interests by supporting the recipient's continuing efforts to modernize its armed forces and to maintain a credible defensive capability. The proposed sale will help improve the security of the recipient and assist in maintaining political stability, military balance, economic and progress in the region.

The proposed sale will help to sustain the recipient's missile density and ensure readiness for air operations. The recipient will use this capability as a deterrent to regional threats and to strengthen homeland defense. The recipient will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment and services into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractors will be Raytheon Technologies in Andover, MA; and Lockheed Martin in Camden, AK. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the permanent assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to recipient. Support teams will travel to recipient on a temporary basis.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ETHICS

Mr. COONS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, for myself as Chairman of the Select Committee on Ethics and for Senator LANKFORD, vice chairman of the committee, that the Annual Report of the Select Committee on Ethics for calendar year 2021 be printed in the RECORD. The committee issued this report on January 31, 2022, as required by the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ETHICS

117TH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION—JANUARY 31, 2022

The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act or 2007 (the Act) calls for the Select Committee on Ethics of the United States Senate to issue an annual report no later than January 31st of each year providing information in certain categories describing its activities for the preceding year. Reported below is the information describing the Committee's activities in 2021 in the categories set forth in the Act:

- (1) The number of alleged violations of Senate rules received from any source. including the number raised by a Senator or staff of the Committee—98 (In addition, 20 alleged violations from previous years were carried into 2021.)
- (2) The number of alleged violations that were dismissed— $\,$
- (A) For lack of subject matter jurisdiction or in which, even if the allegations in the complaint are true, no violation of Senate rules would exist: 78.
- (B) Because they failed to provide sufficient facts as to any material violation of the Senate rules beyond mere allegation or assertion: 11.
- (3) The number of alleged violations for which the Committee staff conducted a preliminary inquiry: 32. (This figure includes 20 matters from previous years carried into 2021.)
- (4) The number of alleged violations for which the Committee staff conducted a preliminary inquiry that resulted in an adjudicatory review: 0.
- (5) The number of alleged violations for which the Committee staff conducted a preliminary inquiry and the Committee dismissed the matter for lack of substantial merit or because it was inadvertent, technical or otherwise of a *de minimis* nature: 19.
- (6) The number of alleged violations for which the Committee staff conducted a preliminary inquiry and the Committee issued private or public letters of admonition: 0.
- (7) The number of matters resulting in a disciplinary sanction: 0.
- (8) Any other information deemed by the Committee to be appropriate to describe its activities in the previous year: